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International Conciliation 



SPECIAL BULLETIN 



THE DAWN IN GERMANY? 

The Lichnowsky and Other 
Disclosures 



PRO 
5 PATRIAE i 

PER 

Lp/ ORBIS ^T 

ICONCORDIA/Aj 



BY 



JAMES BROWN SCOTT 



NOVEMBER, 1918 



AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION 

SUB-STATION 84 (407 WEST II7TH STREET) 

NEW YORK CITY 



l |C ! 



It is the aim of the Association for International Con- 
ciliation to awaken interest and to seek cooperation in 
the movement to promote international good will. This 
movement depends for its ultimate success upon in- 
creased international understanding, appreciation, and 
sympathy. To this end, documents are printed and 
widely circulated, giving information as to the progress 
of the movement and as to matters connected therewith, 
in order that individual citizens, the newspaper press, 
and organizations of various kinds may have accurate 
information on these subjects readily available. 

The Association endeavors to avoid, as far as pos- 
sible, contentious questions, and in particular questions 
relating to the domestic policy of any given nation. 
Attention is to be fixed rather upon those underlying 
principles of international law, international conduct, 
and international organization, which must be agreed 
upon and enforced by all nations if peaceful civiliza- 
tion is to continue and to be advanced. A list of pub- 
lications will be found on pages 27, 28 and 29. 



JAN.-S 1921 



Subscription rate : twenty-five cents for one year, or 
one dollar for five years. 



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THE DAWN IN GERMANY? 

The Lichnowsky and Other Disclosures 

By James Brown Scott 

(Reprinted from The American Journalof InternationalLaw, April, 1918) 

In the earlier part of March extracts appeared in 
the German press of a Memorandum written by Prince 
Lichnowsky, Imperial German Ambassador to Great 
Britain at the outbreak of the war of 19 14, and more 
of this Memorandum is said to have been published 
in the Stockholm Politiken. In the account given in 
the London Times for March 15, 1918, it is said that: 

The Memorandum was written by Prince Lichnowsky about 
eighteen months ago, for the purpose of explaining and justifying 
his position to his personal friends, and only half-a-dozen type- 
written copies were made. One of these copies, through a be- 
trayal, reached the Wilhelmstrasse, and caused a great scandal, 
and another was communicated to some members of the Minority 
Socialist Party; but how it happened that a copy got across the 
German frontier forms a mystery to which Politiken declines to 
give any clue. Internal evidence, however, leaves no doubt in 
regard to the authenticity of the document. It is entitled "My 
London Mission, 1912-1914," and is dated Kuchelna (Prince 
Lichnowsky's country seat), August, 1916. 

The most casual reading of the Memorandum will 
disclose why the Prince's Memorandum has created a 
sensation in Germany, where the views expressed by 
the former Ambassador to Great Britain have not 
been avowed by the authorities. Naturally, they have 
been discussed in the Reichstag, and statements have 

[3] 



.S80 



appeared from time to time in the press that the 
Prince would be tried and punished for treason, or 
sedition, or for some other heinous offense. 

As regards the Reichstag, the London Times, in its 
issue of March 21, 191 8, says in a dispatch from 
Amsterdam, dated the 19th: 

In the Main Committee of the Reichstag the subject of Prince 
Lichnowsky's Memorandum was discussed. Herr von Payer, the 
Vice-Chancellor, read a letter from the Prince, in which he stated 
that the Memorandum had been written with a view to his future 
justification. These notes were intended for the family archives. 
They have found their way into wider circles by an "unprece- 
dented breach of confidence." The Prince expressed regret for 
the incident. 

Herr von Payer stated that the Prince had tendered his resigna- 
tion, which had been accepted, but as he had been simply guilty 
of imprudence, no further steps would be taken against him. 

A few of the more significant passages of the Memo- 
randum are quoted, with summaries of omitted por- 
tions. 

The Prince arrived in London in November, 19 12, 
and found that "people had quieted down about 
Morocco," as an agreement had been reached con- 
cerning this question between France and Germany. 
The Haldane Mission had, he said, failed because 
Germany insisted upon a promise of neutrality, in- 
stead of contenting itself with a treaty with Great 
Britain insuring it against attacks from that country. 
However, Sir Edward Grey, then British Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs, had, to quote the Prince's 
exact language, "not given up the idea of reaching an 
understanding with us and he tried it first in colonial 
and economic matters." The purpose of Sir Edward 
Grey as stated by the German Ambassador was to 
settle outstanding controversies with France and 



58i 



Great Britain, and thereafter reach similar agreements 
with Germany, "not to isolate us," to quote the Prince, 
"but as far as possible to make us partners in the exist- 
ing union. As British-French and British-Russian 
differences had been bridged over, he wished also the 
British-German differences to be settled as far as 
possible and to insure world peace by means of a net- 
work of treaties," which the Prince said would prob- 
ably have included an agreement on the naval question 
after an understanding had been reached obviating 
the dangers of war. Such was Grey's program in his 
own words, the Prince says, apparently quoting Sir 
Edward Grey, upon which the Prince comments that 
it had "'no aggressive aims, and involved 
for England no binding obligations, to reach a friendly 
rapprochement and understanding with Germany*. In 
short, to bring the two groups nearer together." 

Prince Lichnowsky's disclosures concerning the atti- 
tude on the Balkan situation of Austria-Hungary and 
Germany, on the one hand, and Great Britain, on the 
other, are of the utmost importance, as they show an 
agreement of the Central European Powers to exclude 
Russia from Balkan affairs, to substitute their own 
influence for that of Russia, and to make of those 
states dependencies instead of making them inde- 
pendent, inasmuch as the Prince shows that Russian 
influence had really ceased in each instance with the 
independence of each of the Balkan States. 

It will be recalled that Bulgaria, Greece, Monte- 
negro and Serbia, after having beaten Turkey in what 
is known as the First Balkan war, fell out about the 
distribution of the spoils of victory, and that in a 
conference by their plenipotentiaries held in London 
they failed to agree. The consequence was the 

[51 



582 



Second Balkan war, of Greece, Montenegro and Serbia, 
in which Rumania joined, against Bulgaria, which 
had insisted upon the lion's share of the common 
victory. In this second war Bulgaria was badly 
beaten, and the Treaty of Bucharest was concluded 
in 191 3. In these various negotiations, Austria was 
an interested party, insisting that the principality of 
Albania should be created out of the spoils claimed by 
Greece, Serbia and Montenegro, and that Serbia be 
denied an outlet to the seas. The attitude of the 
Central German Powers and of Great Britain is thus 
stated by Prince Lichnowsky, who was then German 
Ambassador to London : 

Soon after my arrival in London, at the end of 19 12, Sir Edward 
Grey suggested an informal conversation in order to prevent a 
European war developing out of the Balkan war. The British 
statesman from the beginning took the stand that England had no 
interest in Albania on account of this question and was therefore 
not willing to let it come to a war. He wished simply as an honest 
broker to mediate between the two groups and settle difficulties. 
He therefore by no means placed himself on the side of the mem- 
bers of the alliance, and during the negotiations, which lasted 
about eight months, he contributed not a little by his good will 
and effectual influence toward bringing about concord and agree- 
ment. Instead of assuming an attitude similar to that of the 
English, we without exception took the position prescribed to us 
from Vienna. Count Mensdorff represented the Triple Alliance 
in London. I was his second. My mission consisted in support- 
ing his propositions. 

So much for the attitude of the different Powers. 
Next as to the conduct of Sir Edward Grey and the 
consequences of the Balkan settlement conducted by 
Austria-Hungary and Germany. On these points the 
Prince said in his Memorandum: 

Grey conducted the negotiations with circumspection, calm- 
ness, and tact. Whenever a question threatened to become com- 

[61 



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plicated, he would draft a form of agreement which hit the matter 
right and always met approval. His personality enjoyed equal 
confidence from all members of the conference. We really again 
successfully stood one of the many tests of strength which char- 
acterize our politics. Russia had had to yield to us everywhere, 
so that she was never in a position to insure success of the Serbian 
wishes. Albania was created as an Austrian vassal state and 
Serbia was driven from the sea. The result of the conference was 
therefore a fresh humiliation for the Russian self-consciousness. 
As in 1878 and 1908, we had taken a stand against the Russian 
program without German interests being at stake. Bismarck 
knew how to mitigate the error of the Congress by secret treaty 
and by his attitude in the Battenberg question. The downward 
path again taken in the Bosnian question was continued in Lon- 
don, and when it led into the abyss it was not opportunely 
abandoned. 

It is common knowledge that Austria-Hungary had 
picked Bulgaria as the winner in the Second Balkan 
war, and that its defeat was a blow to what it con- 
sidered its prestige. The Prince calls attention to this 
in the following passage, and the absence of a specious 
pretext evidently was the reason in the Prince's mind, 
although he does not say so, for the outbreak of the 
war a year earlier than it actually occurred : 

The idea of wiping it out by a campaign against Serbia seems 
soon to have gained ground in Vienna. The Italian revelations 
prove this and it is to be supposed that the Marquis San Giuliano, 
who very appropriately characterized the plan as a most danger- 
ous adventure, preserved us from becoming involved in a world 
war as early as the summer of 1913. 

But however interesting these passages may be, they 
are merely episodes in a memoir whose great value 
consists in the disclosure that before the outbreak of 
the war of 1914, Great Britain had not only, as is well 
known, settled its differences with France and Russia, 
but also that Sir Edward Grey, representing Great 
Britain, had peaceably settled its controversies with 

[7] 



5«4 

Germany; that the terms of the treaty adjusting their 
conflicting claims to the satisfaction of Germany had 
not only been substantially agreed upon, but that the 
treaty itself had been drafted and initialed by Sir 
Edward Grey on behalf of Great Britain, and by Prince 
Lichnowsky on behalf of Germany. 

It appears that the agreement between the two 
countries extended to colonial matters in Africa, as 
well as economic questions in Asia. In regard to the 
former, the Prince says, speaking of the treaty of 1898 : 

Thanks to the obliging attitude of the British Government, I 
succeeded in giving the new treaty a form which fully coincided 
with our wishes and interests. All of Angola up to the 20th degree 
of longitude was assigned to us, so that we reached the Congo 
region from the south ; besides this there were the valuable islands 
of San Thome and Principe. . . . Furthermore, we received the 
northern part of Mozambique. . . . 

"The British Government," the Prince says again, 
"showed the greatest obligingness in behalf of our 
interests. Grey purposed proving to us his good will 
and also furthering our colonial development in gen- 
eral, as England hoped to divert German development 
of strength from the North Sea and from Europe to 
the ocean. 'We do not begrudge Germany her colonial 
development', said a member of the Cabinet to me." 
Of the Asiatic situation, and especially of the Bag- 
dad Railway, the Prince has much to say, and the 
purpose of the two governments appears to have been 
to divide Asia Minor into two spheres of influence. 
The economic enterprises were adjusted essentially 
in accordance with the wishes of the German Bank, 
and the railroad itself was prolonged to Basra, so that 
Bagdad was no longer constituted the terminal point 
of the road. An international commission was to 



585 

attend to the navigation on the Shatt-el-Arab. Ger- 
many was to have a part in the construction of the 
harbor at Basra, and obtain rights in the navigation 
of the Tigris. 

The success of these negotiations and their con- 
sequences not merely to the contracting Powers, but 
to the world at large, are thus stated by the German 
negotiator: 

Under this treaty the whole of Mesopotamia as far as Basra 
became our interest zone, without prejudice to more ancient 
British rights in the Tigris navigation and the Wilcox irrigation 
establishments. Furthermore, we received the whole territory 
of the Bagdad and Anatolian railroad. 

The coasts of the Persian Gulf and the Smyrna-Aidin railroad 
were considered as British economic territory, Syria as French, 
and Armenia as Russian. If both treaties had been concluded 
and published, an understanding would thereby have been reached 
with England which would forever have dispelled all doubts as 
to the possibility of an Anglo-German cooperation. 

In connection with Prince Lichnowsky's Memoran- 
dum, the following three documents are to be con- 
sidered. 

The first is entitled "Terms of the Anglo-German 
Agreement of 1914," as corrected by Dr. Zimmermann, 
Under-Secretary at the outbreak of the war, and later 
Imperial German Secretary of State, and handed in 
1916 to Mr. S. S. McClure. 1 It is thus worded: 

1. The Bagdad Railway from Constantinople to Basra is 
definitely left to German capital in cooperation with Turkey. In 
the territory of the Bagdad Railway German economical working 
will not be hindered by England. 

2. Basra becomes a sea harbor in the building of which Ger- 
man capital is concerned with 60 per cent, and English capital 
with 40 per cent. For the navigation from Basra to the Persian 
Gulf the independence of the open sea is agreed to. 

1 Mr. S. S. McClure's Obstacles to Peace, 191 7, pages 40-42. 

[9] 



586 

3. Kuweit is excluded from the agreement between Germany 
and England. 

4. In the navigation of the Tigris, English capital is interested 
with 50 per cent., German capital with 25 per cent., and Turkish 
with 25 per cent. 

5. The oil-wells of the whole of Mesopotamia shall be devel- 
oped by a British company, the capital of which shall be given at 
50 per cent, by England, at 25 per cent, by the German Bank, at 
25 per cent, by the "Royal Dutch Company" (a company which 
is Dutch, but closely connected with England). For the irriga- 
tion works there had been intended a similar understanding. The 
rights of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, in which, as is known, 
the English Government is concerned, remained unaffected. 
This society exercises south of Basra, on the Schatel-Arabia, as 
well as in all south and central Persia, a monopoly on the pro- 
duction and transport of oil. 

6. A simultaneous German-French agreement leaves free hand 
to French capital for the construction of railways in southern 
Syria and Palestine. 

Besides this, there is an agreement, already made before, 
between Germany and England, concerning Africa, with a 
repartition of their spheres of influence in Angola and Mozam- 
bique. 

Finally there is to be mentioned the Morocco agreement, which 
established the political predominance of France in Morocco, 
but, on the other hand, stated the principle of "open door" to 
the trade of all nations. 

The second is the dispatch of the Belgian Minister 
at Berlin to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs 
dated February 20, 1914, as officially published by 
the German Government in its collection of Belgian 
documents found in the Foreign Office at Brussels, 
upon the occupation of that city by German troops. 2 

2 Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Min- 
ister for Foreign Affairs, February 20, 1914. (Reports of the Belgian 
Representatives in Berlin, London and Paris to the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs in Brussels, 1905-1914.) Issued by the Imperial 
German Foreign Office, 1915, under the title "Belgian Diplomatists". 
No. in, pages 131-132. 



587 



The material portion of this document, confirming 
Prince Lichnowsky's statements regarding the French 
agreement, is as follows: 

The Franco-German agreement concerning Asia Minor, con- 
cluded very recently at Berlin after difficult negotiations and 
thanks to the personal intervention of the Chancellor, assures to 
France a large sphere of action and influence in Syria. She will 
be able to build a railway line starting from Beirut along the 
valley of the Orontes, back of the Antilebanon as far as Aleppo, 
the point of junction with the German lines. Another French 
line, also starting from Beirut, passing through Horns, will reach 
the Euphrates in the direction of the 35th parallel. M. Cambon 
showed me on the map these lines which are not yet known to the 
public. The coast of the Mediterranean between Alexandretta 
and Beirut will be neutralized; no railway can be built there 
either by Germany, or by France, be it along the coast or across 
the Antilebanon. A line of this sort was not considered necessary. 
It would arouse the hostility of the fanatic tribes of the Anti- 
lebanon, who close their country to Europeans and carry the 
products of the soil, the chief one of which is tobacco, to the har- 
bor of Latakia themselves. The difficulty of the negotiations 
consisted principally in the exact delimitation of the French and 
German zones of influence (60 kilometers on each side of the rail- 
way), so as to prevent them from overlapping. In addition to 
this, France retains the railway concessions which she obtained 
from Turkey in the rich mineral district of ancient Cappadocia, 
along the Black Sea, and the very profitable railway of Smyrna 
and Casaba. 

The third document is entitled "The Bagdad Rail- 
way. Complete Anglo-German Agreement," and, as 
contained in the London Times for June 16, 1914, is 
as follows: 

Berlin, June 15 (Through Reuter's Agency) 

The Anglo-German Agreement regarding the Bagdad Rail- 
way and Mesopotamia has been initialed in London by Sir Edward 
Grey and Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador. A com- 
plete understanding has been reached on all questions at issue. 

The agreement will not come into force until after the con- 
clusion of the negotiations with Turkey, as on some material 

In] 



588 

points the assent of the Porte will be necessary. The contents of 
the agreement can therefore not be divulged at present. 

In another portion of the Memorandum the German 
Ambassador writes of the Serbian crisis that led to the 
war of 19 14, and this section of his revelations is a 
damaging indictment of the policy which his country 
pursued. "On board the Meteor [the Kaiser's yacht], 
we heard," he says, "of the death of the Archduke, 
the heir to the Austrian Throne. His Majesty ex- 
pressed regret that his efforts to win the Archduke 
over to his ideas had thus been rendered vain." What 
these views were, the Ambassador evidently did not 
know. 

Going to Berlin, he found von Bethmann-Hollweg, 
then Imperial Chancellor, much troubled at the out- 
look, and he complained of Russian armaments. The 
distrust and dislike of Russia appeared to pervade the 
Foreign Office. Dr. Zimmermann, the Under-Secre- 
tary for Foreign Affairs, stated that Russia was about 
to raise nine hundred thousand fresh troops, and "his 
words showed an unmistakable animosity against 
Russia, who, he said, was everywhere in our way." 

The Prince refers to the Potsdam council on July 5, 
1 9 14, of which he was not informed at the time, and 
about which he contents himself with saying: "Sub- 
sequently I learned that at the decisive conversation 
at Potsdam on July 5 the inquiry addressed to us by 
Vienna found absolute assent among all the person- 
ages in authority; indeed, they added that there 
would be no harm if a war with Russia were to result." 
Apparently the die had been cast; Austria-Hungary 
was to take action against Serbia, and the attempt was 
to be made to localize the trouble. That is to say, the 
whole affair was to be looked upon as a bout between 

[12] 



5§9 

Austria-Hungary and Serbia, to which the European 
Powers might be spectators, but not participants. 
This is indicated by the Prince, who says: "I then 
received instructions that I was to induce the English 
press to take up a friendly attitude if Austria gave the 
'death-blow' to the Great Serbian movement, and as 
far as possible I was by my influence to prevent public 
opinion from opposing Austria." 

The Prince believed that England could not be 
counted upon and he warned his government against 
the projected punitive expedition against the little 
country; indeed, he says that he gave a warning 
against the whole project, which he described as 
"adventurous and dangerous," and he advised that 
moderation be recommended to the Austrians because 
he did not believe in the localization of the conflict. 
To this warning Herr von Jagow is reported to have 
answered that Russia was not "ready," that there 
would doubtless be a certain amount of "bluster," 
but that the firmer Germany stood by Austria, "the 
more would Russia draw back." The Prince states 
that the then German Ambassador, Count Pourtales, 
had informed his government "that Russia would not 
move in any circumstance," and that these reports 
caused Germany to "stimulate" Austria-Hungary "to 
the greatest possible energy." Sir Edward Grey's 
influence with Russia was the only hope of maintain- 
ing peace, and the Prince therefore begged him to 
urge moderation in Russia if Austria should demand 
satisfaction from Serbia. The Prince was not success- 
ful with the English press, which felt that exploitation 
of the assassination of the Austrian heir for political 
purposes could not be justified, and the English press 
urged moderation on Austria's part. 

[i3l 



590 

Upon the appearance of the ultimatum on July 24, 
giving Serbia twenty-four hours in which to accept the 
conditions, "the whole world," the Prince says, "except 
in Berlin and Vienna, understood that it meant war, 
and indeed world-war. The British fleet, which 
chanced to be assembled for a review, was not de- 
mobilized." 

In order to prevent this catastrophe, the Prince ap- 
parently urged Sir Edward Grey to press for a con- 
ciliatory reply from Serbia, as the attitude of the 
Russian Government showed that the situation was 
very serious. Sir Edward Grey complied, and to 
quote the Prince's language, on the attitude of the 
British Government at this time, "the Serbian reply 
was in accordance with British efforts; M. Pashitch 
[the Serbian Premier] had actually accepted every- 
thing except two points, about which he declared his 
readiness to negotiate." The action of Sir Edward 
Grey and of Russia, which had already suggested 
modification, was indeed very important, so important 
that the Prince felt himself justified in saying: "If 
Russia and England wanted war, in order to fall upon 
us, a hint to Belgrade would have been sufficient, and 
the unheard-of note would have remained unanswered." 

Sir Edward went over the Serbian reply with the 
German Ambassador, and they discussed Sir Edward's 
mediation proposal, "to arrange an interpretation of 
the two points acceptable to both parties." The 
French, the Italian, and the German Ambassadors 
were to have met under Sir Edward's presidency, and 
the whole difficulty could have been adjusted, the 
Prince saying, "It would have been easy to find an 
acceptable form for the disputed points which in the 
main concerned the participation of the Austrian 

[14] 



591 



officials in the investigation at Belgrade. Given good 
will, everything could have been settled in one or two 
sittings, and the mere acceptance of the British pro- 
posal would have relieved the tension and would have 
improved our relations to England." The Prince was 
so convinced of this that he urged it upon his govern- 
ment, saying that "otherwise a world-war was immi- 
nent, in which we had everything to lose and nothing 
to gain." The advice, however, was rejected, as it 
was against the dignity of Austria, and Germany did 
not want to interfere in the Serbian affair which was 
the affair of its ally, and the Prince was directed to 
work for "localization of the conflict." 

The Prince had no illusions as to the attitude of his 
government, or misgivings as to the result of Sir 
Edward's policy, for he says: "Of course it would 
only have needed a hint from Berlin to make Count 
Berchtold [Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs] 
satisfy himself with a diplomatic success and put up 
with the Serbian reply. But this hint was not given. 
On the contrary, we pressed for war." 

Germany not only refused Sir Edward's proposal, 
but had none of its own to make. The impression, the 
Prince said, became stronger that his country desired 
war, and after calling attention to the Russian appeals 
and declarations of the Russian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, the Czar's humble telegrams, Sir Edward's 
repeated proposals, the warning of the Italian Foreign 
Minister, of the Italian Ambassador in Berlin, and 
his own urgent advice, the Prince concludes, "It was 
all of no use, for Berlin went on insisting that Serbia 
must be massacred." 

"After that," the Prince says, "events moved rapidly. 
When Count Berchtold, who hitherto had played the 

[i5l 



592 



strong man on instructions from Berlin, at last decided 
to change his course, we answered the Russian 
mobilization — after Russia had for a whole week 
negotiated and waited in vain — with our ultimatum 
and declaration of war." 

With England's entry into the conflict the Prince's 
mission was at an end. "It was wrecked," he says, 
"not by the perfidy of the British, but by the perfidy 
of our policy." 

Under the next section of the Memorandum the 
Prince has some reflections under the title of "Retro- 
spect," written two years later, in which he ruefully 
comments that there was no place for him in a system 
which "tolerates only representatives who report what 
one wants to read," and he might have added in this 
connection what he says elsewhere, under a system 
which keeps an Ambassador uninformed of negotia- 
tions taking place elsewhere, and even has the coun- 
selor of the Embassy spy upon the Ambassador, report 
his conduct to the Foreign Office, and conduct negotia- 
tions behind his back. 

After some observations that might be considered 
of a personal character, he says : 

In spite of former aberrations, everything was still possible in 
July, 1914. Agreement with England had been reached. We 
should have had to send to Petersburg a representative who at 
any rate reached the average standard of political ability, and 
we should have had to give Russia the certainty that we desired 
neither to dominate the Straits nor to throttle the Serbs. 

Germany, he insists, "needed neither alliances nor 
wars, but merely treaties which would protect us and 
others, and which would guarantee us an economic 
development for which there had been no precedent 
in history." The Prince even believes that his country 

[16] 



593 

could have taken up the question of the limitation of 
armaments, without needing to think of Austria, much 
less to follow whithersoever it cared to go, but, "I had 
to support in London a policy which I knew to be fal- 
lacious. I was punished for it, for it was a sin against 
the Holy Ghost." 

There are passages from two sections which should 
be quoted in the Prince's own words, as the interven- 
tion of a third hand might convey the impression that 
they had been tampered with. They are the "Question 
of Guilt," and "The Enemy Point of View." 

Under the first caption the Prince writes : 

As appears from all official publications, without the facts being 
controverted by our own White Book, which, owing to its poverty 
and gaps, constitutes a grave self-accusation; 

1. We encouraged Count Berchtold to attack Serbia, although 
no German interest was involved, and the danger of a world- war 
must have been known to us — whether we knew the text of the 
ultimatum is a question of complete indifference; 

2. In the days between July 23 and July 30, 1914, when 
M. Sazonoff emphatically declared that Russia could not tolerate 
an attack upon Serbia, v/e rejected the British proposals of media- 
tion, although Serbia, under Russian and British pressure, had 
accepted almost the whole ultimatum, and although an agreement 
about the two points in question could easily have been reached, 
and Count Berchtold was even ready to satisfy himself with the 
Serbian reply; 

3. On July 30, when Count Berchtold wanted to give way, we, 
without Austria having been attacked, replied to Russia's mere 
mobilization by sending an ultimatum to Petersburg, and on 
July 31 we declared war on the Russians, although the Tsar had 
pledged his word that as long as negotiations continued not a man 
should march — so that we deliberately destroyed the possibility 
of a peaceful settlement. 

In view of these indisputable facts, it is not surprising that the 
whole civilized world outside Germany attributes to us the sole 
guilt for the world-war. 

[17] 



594 



Under the second caption he says: 

Is it not intelligible that our enemies declare that they will not 
rest until a system is destroyed which constitutes a permanent 
threatening of our neighbors? Must they not otherwise fear that 
in a few years they will again have to take up arms, and again see 
their provinces overrun and their towns and villages destroyed? 
Were those people not right who declared that it was the spirit 
of Treitschke and Bernhardi which dominated the German 
people — the spirit which glorifies war as an aim in itself and does 
not abhor it as an evil? Were those people not right who said 
that among us it is still the feudal knights and Junkers and the 
caste of warriors who rule and who fix our ideals and our values 
— not the civilian gentlemen? Were they not right who said 
that the love of duelling, which inspires our youth at the univer- 
sities, lives on in those who guide the fortunes of the people? Had 
not the events at Zabern and the parliamentary debates on that 
case shown foreign countries how civil rights and freedoms are 
valued among us, when questions of military power are on the 
other side? . . . 

That is what our enemies think, and that is what they are 
bound to think, when they see that, in spite of capitalistic indus- 
trialization, and in spite of socialistic organization, the living, as 
Friedrich Nietzsche says, are still governed by the dead. The 
principal war aim of our enemies, the democratization of Ger- 
many, will be achieved. 

In the same issue of the London Times of March 28, 
1 91 8, from which this account of Lichnowsky's revela- 
tions have been summarized, there is a translation of 
a very interesting, and what the Times calls "astonish- 
ing memorandum" by one Dr. Wilhelm Muehlon, a 
Director of the Krupp Works at Essen at the time of 
the outbreak of the war, and for some time thereafter. 
Muehlon's memorandum figured in the debate in the 
Reichstag committee on March 16, and it is stated by 
the Times to have appeared in the Berliner Tageblatt, 
from which it is reproduced in translated form. It 
should be stated, before proceeding to the analysis of 

[18] 



595 



the memorandum, that Dr. Muehlon is now a resident 
of Switzerland. 

It is natural that this memorandum should be con- 
sidered in connection with that of the late German 
Ambassador to Great Britain, as it confirms some of 
his statements and furnishes precious information 
hitherto withheld from the public, as it apparently 
was from the Imperial Ambassador at London. Dr. 
Muehlon records conversations which he had about the 
middle of July, 1914, with Dr. HelfTerich, then 
Director of the Deutsche Bank in Berlin, and later 
Vice-Chancellor of the Empire, and with Herr Krupp 
von Bohlen and Halbach, head of the Krupp firm, of 
which Dr. Muehlon was a Director. 

The Krupp people were interested in some large 
transactions in Bulgaria and Turkey, and apparently 
Dr. Muehlon saw Helfferich in regard to them. The 
Deutsche Bank was evidently unwilling to meet Dr. 
Muehlon's advances. Dr. Helfferich stated the reasons 
in a peculiarly frank and interesting manner : 

The political situation has become very menacing. The 
Deutsche Bank must in any case wait before entering into any 
further engagements abroad. The Austrians have just been with 
the Kaiser. In a week's time Vienna will send a very severe 
ultimatum to Serbia, with a very short interval for the answer. 
The ultimatum will contain demands such as punishment of a 
number of officers, dissolution of political associations, criminal 
investigations in Serbia by Austrian officials, and, in fact, a whole 
series of definite satisfactions will be demanded at once; other- 
wise Austria-Hungary will declare war on Serbia. 

This implied a very considerable familiarity with 
the future as well as with the past, and it is not sur- 
prising, as German finance and German diplomacy are 
so interrelated, that one involves the other. 

The future Vice-Chancellor had evidently and prop- 
[19] 



596 



erly enough been taken into the secret, for Dr. Muehlon 
continues that Dr. Helfferich added: 

The Kaiser had expressed his decided approval of this pro- 
cedure on the part of Austria-Hungary. He had said that he 
regarded a conflict with Serbia as an internal affair between these 
two countries, in which he would permit no other state to inter- 
fere. If Russia mobilized, he would mobilize also. But in his 
case mobilization meant immediate war. This time there would 
be no oscillation. 

This was probably a reference to the Moroccan 
question, in which war trembled in the balance, but 
peace eventually tipped the scales. 

According to Helfferich, "the Austrians were ex- 
tremely well satisfied at this determined attitude on 
the part of the Kaiser." 

This disclosure made a very great impression upon 
Dr. Muehlon, who had feared a world-war, and ap- 
parently felt that it could not be avoided unless France 
and Russia reconsidered their attitude. Upon his 
return from Berlin to Essen it was natural that Dr. 
Muehlon should communicate this bit of news to Herr 
Krupp von Bohlen, and Dr. Helfferich had given him 
permission to do so, but it was not news to Herr von 
Bohlen, who had recently been with the Kaiser and 
who, according to Dr. Muehlon, "had spoken to him 
also of his conversation with the Austrians, and of its 
result, but he [evidently meaning the Kaiser] had 
described the matter as so secret that he [Krupp] 
would not even have dared to inform his own direc- 
tors." Krupp confirmed Helfferich's statements, say- 
ing that the situation was very serious, and that "the 
Kaiser had told him that he would declare war im- 
mediately if Russia mobilized, and that this time 
people would see that he did not turn about." The 

[20] 



597 

subsequent events have shown that these two gentle- 
men were only too well informed, as on the very day 
indicated by Heltterich. the Austrian ultimatum ap- 
peared. 

Meeting Dr. Heltterich after the ultimatum had 
been sent, that gentleman is reported by Dr. Muehlon 
to have said "that the Kaiser had gone on his northern 
cruise only as a 'blind' ; he had not arranged the cruise 
on the usual extensive scale but was remaining close 
at hand and keeping in constant touch;" there was 
nothing to do but to wait and to see what would 
happen, and according to Dr. Heltterich . as recorded 
by Dr. Muehlon, the Austrians did not expect the 
ultimatum to be accepted, and they were "acting 
rapidly, before the other Powers could find time to 
interfere." 

In a subsequent conversation had with Herr Krupp 
von Bohlen. the statement of the German Government 
that Austria-Hungary had acted alone, without Ger- 
many's previous knowledge, was the subject of dis- 
cussion, and such conduct on the part of Germany 
appeared to them inexplicable, as it has to many 
others, inasmuch as by so doing Germany apparently 
gave Austria a free hand, without informing itself as 
to what that hand would do. Herr von Bohlen, there- 
fore, asked his friend, von Jagow, then Imperial Secre- 
tary of State for Foreign Affairs., with whom he was 
very intimate, who informed him that " he had nothing 
to do with the text of the Austro-Hungarian ultima- 
tum, and that Germany had never made any such 
demands." Herr von Bohlen remarked that such ac- 
tion was inconceivable, and Herr von Jagow is stated 
to have replied that he. as a diplomatist, had naturally 
thought of inquiring as to the extent to which Austria 



598 



had intended to go, but when called in "the Kaiser 
had," to quote Dr. Muehlon's memorandum, "so com- 
mitted himself that it was too late for any procedure 
according to diplomatic custom, and there was nothing 
more to be done." 

It was not to be expected that Lichnowsky's Memo- 
randum would be allowed to pass without notice on 
the part of the Imperial officials whom the Prince had 
implicated in the misconduct of German affairs. On 
March 20, 191 8, Herr von Jagow made some observa- 
tions on the Memorandum in the North German 
Gazette. Certain minor matters are questioned, and 
some errors of detail corrected, but the former Im- 
perial Secretary of State proceeds with the care and 
caution becoming one who was apparently writing 
from memory. Certain statements which von Jagow 
advances on his own account are of more than ordinary 
interest, and seem to be admissions of the general 
correctness of Lichnowsky's Memorandum, and in 
any event are to be considered as evidence coming from 
German sources that Great Britain had by negotiation 
removed great and outstanding differences which, but 
for other reasons, would and should have prevented 
the two nations from falling out. Thus Herr von 
Jagow says : 

When, in January, 1913, I was appointed Secretary of State 
I regarded an Anglo-German rapprochement as desirable, and an 
agreement about the points at which our interests touched or 
crossed as obtainable. In any case, I wanted to try to work in 
this sense. A main point for us was the Mesopotamia-Asia Minor 
question — the so-called Bagdad policy — because it had become 
for us a question of prestige. If England wanted to push us out 
there, a conflict seemed, indeed, to me to be hardly avoidable. 
As soon as possible I took up in Berlin the settlement about the 
Bagdad Railway. We found the English Government ready to 

[22] 



599 



meet us, and the result was the agreement which had almost been 
completed when the world-war broke out. 

At the same time the negotiations about the Portuguese col- 
onies, which had been begun by Count Metternich and continued 
by Baron Marschall, were resumed by Prince Lichnowsky. I 
intended to begin later on — when the Bagdad Railway question, 
in my opinion the most important question, had been settled — 
further agreements about other questions, in the Far East, for 
example. 3 

This would seem to be an admission that agreement 
was reached with Great Britain concerning the Bagdad 
policy and the Portuguese colonies, and of the correct- 
ness of Lichnowsky's account of these transactions. 
The reason for the refusal to complete and to publish 
these treaties at that time is thus stated by the former 
Imperial Secretary: 

With well-justified prudence we intended to postpone publica- 
tion until an appropriate moment, when the danger of adverse 
criticism was no longer so acute — if possible simultaneously with 
the publication of the Bagdad Treaty, which also was on the eve 
of conclusion. The fact that two great agreements had been con- 
cluded between England and us would have made the reception 
considerably more favorable, and would have helped us over the 
defects of the Portuguese agreement. Our hesitation was due to 
respect for the effect of the agreement, with which we desired to 
achieve an improvement of our relations to England and not a 
fresh disturbance of them. It is true — although this was a 
secondary consideration — that we were also influenced by the aims 
which we were then making to secure economic interests in the 
Portuguese colonies; these interests would, of course, have been 
more difficult to secure if the agreement had been published. 

Herr von Jagow, like Prince Lichnowsky, pays his 
tribute to Sir Edward Grey, but reproaches him with 
not preventing the war. This would indeed be a 
serious charge, if Sir Edward could have prevented it, 

• Reproduced in part, in English translation, in the London Times, 
April i, 1918. 

[23] 



6oo 



but it is at any rate less serious than that he had begun 
it. On this point and the apparent disinclination of 
the English people to go to war, Herr von Jagow 
remarks : 

I am by no means willing to adopt the opinion, which is at 
present widely held in Germany, that England laid all the mines 
which caused the war; on the contrary, I believe in Sir Edward 
Grey's love of peace and in his serious wish to reach an agreement 
with us. But he had involved himself too deeply in the net of 
Franco- Russian policy. He could no longer find the way out, 
and he did not prevent the world-war — as he could have done. 
Among the English people also the war was not popular, and 
Belgium had to serve as a battlefield. 

It is with difficulty that the undersigned has resisted 
the temptation of an observation here and there of his 
own, but as a citizen of a belligerent country, he has 
endeavored to refrain from comment, and to allow the 
views of the various personages quoted or summarized 
to speak for themselves. But what would seem preju- 
dice on the part of a citizen of a country at war with 
the Imperial German Government may not seem to 
be so on the part of a German subject. Therefore, a 
portion of a letter is quoted in conclusion, written from 
Bern, to the then Imperial Chancellor, Herr von 
Bethmann-Hollweg, under date of May 7, 191 7, by 
Dr. Wilhelm Muehlon, who, after the outbreak of the 
war, had, in 1916, negotiated treaties on behalf of 
Germany with Rumania before its entry into the war. 
This letter is printed in the London Times of April 4, 
1 91 8, and is said to have been given to the corre- 
spondent of the Parisian Socialist journal U Humanite 
and published by him with the writer's consent : 

However great the number and weight of the mistakes accumu- 
lated on the German side since the beginning of the war, I never- 

[24] 



6oi 



theless persisted for a long time in the belief that a belated 
foresight would at last dawn upon the minds of our directors. . . . 

But since the first days of 191 7 I have abandoned all hope as 
regards the present directors of Germany. Our offer of peace 
without indication of our war aims, the accentuation of the sub- 
marine war, the deportation of Belgians, the systematic destruc- 
tion in France, and the torpedoing of English hospital ships have 
so degraded the governors of the German Empire that J. am 
profoundly convinced that they are disqualified forever from the 
elaboration and conclusion of a sincere and just agreement. The 
personalities may change, but they cannot remain the repre- 
sentatives of the German cause. 

The German people will not be able to repair the grievous 
crimes committed against its own present and future, and against 
that of Europe and the whole human race until it is represented 
by different men with a different mentality. To tell the truth, it 
is mere justice that its reputation throughout the whole world is 
as bad as it is. The triumph of its methods — the methods by 
which it has hitherto conducted the war both militarily and 
politically — would constitute a defeat for the ideas and the 
supreme hopes of mankind. One has only to imagine that a 
people exhausted, demoralized, or hating violence, should consent 
to a peace with a government which has conducted such a war, 
in order to understand how the general level and the changes of 
life of the peoples would remain black and deceptive. 

As a man and as a German who desires nothing but the welfare 
of the deceived and tortured German people, I turn away defi- 
nitely from the present representatives of the German regime. 
And I have only one wish — that all independent men may do the 
same, and that many Germans may understand and act. 

That the soul of Germany, as its friends in other 
days have seen it or felt it to be, may regain the 
ascendancy, and that the ideals of Kant may prevail 
over the practices of Clausewitz and his successors, 
is the hope and prayer of the undersigned. 

James Brown Scott 



[25] 



LIST OF PUBLICATIONS 

Nos. 1-112 (April, 1907, to April, 1917). Including papers by Baron 
d'Estournelles de Constant, George Trumbull Ladd, Elihu Root, Barrett 
Wendell, Charles E. Jefferson, Seth Low, John Bassett Moore, William James, 
Andrew Carnegie, Pope Pius X, Heinrich Lammasch, Norman Angell, Charles 
W. Eliot, Sir Oliver Lodge, Lord Haldane, Alfred H. Fried, James Bryce, and 
others; also, a series of official documents dealing with the European War. 
A list of titles and authors will be sent on application. 

113. The Bases of an Enduring Peace, by Franklin H. Giddings. April, 1917. 

114. Documents Regarding the European War. Series No. XV. 

The Entry of the United States. May, 19 17. 

115. The War and the Colleges, from an Address to Representatives of Col- 

leges and Universities, delivered by the Hon. Newton D. Baker, May 5, 
1917. June, 1917. 

116. The Treaty Rights of Aliens, by William Howard Taft. July, 19 17. 

117. The Effect of Democracy on International Law, by Elihu Root. August, 

I9I7- 

118. The Problem of Nationality. Part III of The Principle of Nationality, 

by Theodore Ruyssen. September, 19 17. 

119. Official Documents Looking Toward Peace, Series III. October, 1917. 

120. The United States and Great Britain, by Walter H. Page. The British 

Commonwealth of Nations, by Lieutenant-General J. C. Smuts. 
America and Freedom, by Viscount Grey. November, 1917. 

I2X. The Conference on the Foreign Relations of the United States, held at 
Long Beach, N. Y., May 28-June 1, 1917. An Experiment in Educa- 
tion, by Stephen Pierce Duggan. December, 1917. 

122. The Aims of the War: Letter of Lord Lansdowne to the London Daily 

Telegraph, November 29, 1917. Reply by Cosmos printed in the New 
York Times, December 1, 1917. The President's Address to the Con- 
gress, December 4, 19 17. January, 19 18. 

123. Victory or Defeat: No Half-way House, speech delivered by the Rt. Hon. 

David Lloyd George, December 14, 1917; British Labor's War Aims, 
statement adopted at the Special National Labor Conference at Central 
Hall, Westminster, December 28, 1917; Great Britain's War Aims, 
speech delivered by the Rt. Hon. David Lloyd George at the Trade 
Union Conference on Man Power, January 5, 1918; Labor's After- War 
Economic Policy, by the Rt. Hon. Arthur Henderson, M.P.; America's 
Terms of Settlement, address by President Wilson to the Congress, 
January 8, 1918. British Labor Party's Address to the Russian People, 
January 15, 1918. February, 1918. 

[27] 



124. The United States and Japan: text of the Root-Takahira Understanding 

of November 30, 1908, and of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement of Novem- 
ber 3, 1917; Japan and the United States, address by the Hon. Elihu 
Root, October 1, 1917; The Lansing-Ishii Agreement, address by the 
Hon. James L. Slayden, November is, 1917; What of Our Fears of 
Japan? by Kenneth S. Latourette. March, 1918. 

125. The Awakening of the German People, by Otfried Nippold. April, 1918. 

126. The Anniversary of America's Entry into the War: An address delivered 

by President Wilson at Baltimore, Maryland, April 6, 1918; an article 
written for The Daily Chronicle of London by Professor Gilbert 
Murray. May, 1918. 

127. The Lichnowsky Memorandum: Introduction and translation by Munroe 

Smith, German text from the Berliner Bar sen-Courier, Appendix by 
Munroe Smith and Henry F. Munro; Reply of Herr von Jagow. June, 
1918. 

128. America and the Russian Dilemma, by Jerome Landfield. The German 

Peace Treaties and Middle Europe. July, 1918. 

129. A Voice from Germany: Why German Peace Declarations Fail to Con- 

vince, by Professor F. W. Foerster. Austria's Peace Proposals: The 
Letter to Prince Sixtus. August, 1918. 

130. Memoranda and Letters of Dr. Muehlon: Introduction and translation 

by Munroe Smith, German text and Appendix. September, 1918. 

131. The League of Nations, by Viscount Grey of Falloden and Nicholas Mur- 

ray Butler; Labor and the League of Nations, by Ordway Tead; The 
European Commission of the Danube, by Edward Krehbiel. Address 
by President Wilson at the Metropolitan Opera House, New York, 
September 27, 1918. October, 1918. 

132. The "Lusitania": Opinion of Court, United States District Court, South- 

ern District of New York; In the matter of the petition of the Cunard 
Steamship Company, Limited, as owners of the Steamship "Lusitania", 
for limitations of its liability. November, 1918. 

Special Bulletins: 

Internationalism. A list of Current Periodicals selected and annotated 
by Frederick C. Hicks. May, 1915. 

Is Commerce War? By Henry Raymond Mussey. January, 1916. 

Is There a Substitute for Force in International Relations? by Suh Hu. 
Prize essay, International Polity Club Competition, awarded June, 
1916. 

Labor's War Aims: Memorandum on War Aims, adopted by the Inter- 
Allied Labor and Socialist Conference, February 22, 1918; The Allied 
Cause is the Cause of Socialist Internationalism: Joint Manifesto of the 
Social Democratic League of America and the Jewish Socialist League. 
June, 19 1 8. 



[28] 



The Dawn in Germany? The Lichnowsky and Other Disclosures, by 
James Brown Scott. November, 1918. 

Copies of the above, so far as they can be spared, will be sent to libraries 
and educational institutions for permanent preservation postpaid upon receipt 
of a request addressed to the Secretary of the American Association for Inter- 
national Conciliation. 

A charge of five cents will be made for copies sent to individuals. Regular 
subscription rate twenty-five cents for one year, or one dollar for five years. 



[29] 



AMERICAN ASSOCIATION 
FOR INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION 

Executive Committee 

Nicholas Murray Butler Stephen Henry Olin 

James Speyer Robert A. Franks 

James L. Slayden George Blumenthal 

Joseph P. Grace Gano Dunn 

Thomas W. Lamont 

Acting Secretary 
Henry S. Haskell 

Director of Interamerican Division 
Peter H. Goldsmith 

Correspondents 

Francis W. Hirst, London, England 
T. Miyaoka, Tokyo, Japan 

Organizing Secretaries for South America 

Benjamin Garcia Victorica, American Legation, Buenos Aires 
A. G. Araujo Jorge, Foreign Office, Rio de Janeiro 
Juan Bautista de Lavelle, San Pedro, 88, Lima 



COUNCIL OF DIRECTION OF THE 

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNATIONAL 

CONCILIATION 



Lyman Abbott, New York 

Edwin A. Alderman, Charlottesville, 

Va. 
John R. Alpine, Chicago, III. 
Robert Bacon, New York 
Richard Bartholdt, St. Louis, Mo. 
George Blumenthal, New York 
Clifton R. Breckenridge, Fort Smith, 

Arkansas 
William J. Bryan, Lincoln, Nebraska 
T. E. Burton, Cleveland, Ohio 
Nicholas Murray Butler, New York 
Andrew Carnegie, New York 
Richard H. Dana, Boston, Mass. 
Arthur L. Dasher, Macon, Ga. 
Horace E. Deming, New York 
Gano Dunn, New York 
Charles W. Eliot, Cambridge, Mass. 
Austen G. Fox, New York 
Robert A. Franks, Orange, N. J. 
John P. Frey, Cincinnati, Ohio 
Robert Garrett, Baltimore, Md. 
Joseph P. Grace, New York 
William Green, Indianapolis, Ind. 
William J. Holland, Pittsburgh, Pa. 
Hamilton Holt, New York 
David Starr Jordan, Stanford 

University, Cal. 
J. H. Kirkland, Nashville, Tenn. 
Mrs. James Lees Laidlaw, New York 
Thomas W. Lamont, New York 
Adolph Lewisohn, New York 
Clarence H. Mackay, New York 



Theodore Marburg, Baltimore, Md. 

Brander Matthews, New York 

Silas McBee, New York 

George B. McClellan, Princeton, N. J. 

Andrew J. Montague, Richmond, Va. 

Mrs. Philip .N. Moore, Washington, D. C. 

W. W. Morrow, San Francisco, Cal. 

Levi P. Morton, New York 

Stephen H. Olin, New York 

Mrs. Percy V. Pennybacker, New York 

Henry S. Pritchett, New York 

A. V. V. Raymond, Buffalo, N. Y. 

Ira Remsen, Baltimore, Md. 

James Ford Rhodes, Boston, Mass. 

Elihu Root, New York 

J. G. Schurman, Ithaca, N. Y. 

James Brown Scott, Washington, D. C. 

Charles Hitchcock Sherrill, New York 

Mrs. Seward A. Simons, Los Angeles, Cal. 

F. J. V. Skiff, Chicago, III. 

James L. Slayden, Washington, D. C. 

William M. Sloane, New York 

James Speyer, New York 

Oscar S. Straus, New York 

Mrs. Mary Wood Swift, Berkeley, Cal. 

George W. Taylor, Demopolis, Ala. 

O. H. Tittman, Washington, D. C. 

W. H. Tolman, New York 

Charlemagne Tower, Philadelphia, Pa. 

Edward Tuck, Paris, France 

George E. Vincent, New York 

William D. Wheelwright, Portland, Ore. 

Mary E. Woolley, South Hadley, Mass. 



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